1.0.0
Tschuss Status Quo - Hallo, Zukunft!
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217
src/protocol/obfuscation.rs
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217
src/protocol/obfuscation.rs
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//! MTProto Obfuscation
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use crate::crypto::{sha256, AesCtr};
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use crate::error::Result;
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use super::constants::*;
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/// Obfuscation parameters from handshake
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#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
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pub struct ObfuscationParams {
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/// Key for decrypting client -> proxy traffic
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pub decrypt_key: [u8; 32],
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/// IV for decrypting client -> proxy traffic
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pub decrypt_iv: u128,
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/// Key for encrypting proxy -> client traffic
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pub encrypt_key: [u8; 32],
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/// IV for encrypting proxy -> client traffic
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pub encrypt_iv: u128,
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/// Protocol tag (abridged/intermediate/secure)
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pub proto_tag: ProtoTag,
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/// Datacenter index
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pub dc_idx: i16,
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}
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impl ObfuscationParams {
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/// Parse obfuscation parameters from handshake bytes
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/// Returns None if handshake doesn't match any user secret
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pub fn from_handshake(
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handshake: &[u8; HANDSHAKE_LEN],
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secrets: &[(String, Vec<u8>)], // (username, secret_bytes)
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) -> Option<(Self, String)> {
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// Extract prekey and IV for decryption
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let dec_prekey_iv = &handshake[SKIP_LEN..SKIP_LEN + PREKEY_LEN + IV_LEN];
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let dec_prekey = &dec_prekey_iv[..PREKEY_LEN];
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let dec_iv_bytes = &dec_prekey_iv[PREKEY_LEN..];
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// Reversed for encryption direction
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let enc_prekey_iv: Vec<u8> = dec_prekey_iv.iter().rev().copied().collect();
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let enc_prekey = &enc_prekey_iv[..PREKEY_LEN];
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let enc_iv_bytes = &enc_prekey_iv[PREKEY_LEN..];
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for (username, secret) in secrets {
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// Derive decryption key
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let mut dec_key_input = Vec::with_capacity(PREKEY_LEN + secret.len());
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dec_key_input.extend_from_slice(dec_prekey);
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dec_key_input.extend_from_slice(secret);
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let decrypt_key = sha256(&dec_key_input);
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let decrypt_iv = u128::from_be_bytes(dec_iv_bytes.try_into().unwrap());
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// Create decryptor and decrypt handshake
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let mut decryptor = AesCtr::new(&decrypt_key, decrypt_iv);
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let decrypted = decryptor.decrypt(handshake);
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// Check protocol tag
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let tag_bytes: [u8; 4] = decrypted[PROTO_TAG_POS..PROTO_TAG_POS + 4]
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.try_into()
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.unwrap();
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let proto_tag = match ProtoTag::from_bytes(tag_bytes) {
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Some(tag) => tag,
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None => continue, // Try next secret
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};
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// Extract DC index
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let dc_idx = i16::from_le_bytes(
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decrypted[DC_IDX_POS..DC_IDX_POS + 2].try_into().unwrap()
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);
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// Derive encryption key
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let mut enc_key_input = Vec::with_capacity(PREKEY_LEN + secret.len());
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enc_key_input.extend_from_slice(enc_prekey);
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enc_key_input.extend_from_slice(secret);
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let encrypt_key = sha256(&enc_key_input);
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let encrypt_iv = u128::from_be_bytes(enc_iv_bytes.try_into().unwrap());
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return Some((
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ObfuscationParams {
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decrypt_key,
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decrypt_iv,
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encrypt_key,
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encrypt_iv,
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proto_tag,
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dc_idx,
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},
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username.clone(),
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));
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}
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None
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}
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/// Create AES-CTR decryptor for client -> proxy direction
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pub fn create_decryptor(&self) -> AesCtr {
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AesCtr::new(&self.decrypt_key, self.decrypt_iv)
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}
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/// Create AES-CTR encryptor for proxy -> client direction
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pub fn create_encryptor(&self) -> AesCtr {
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AesCtr::new(&self.encrypt_key, self.encrypt_iv)
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}
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/// Get the combined encrypt key and IV for fast mode
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pub fn enc_key_iv(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
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let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(KEY_LEN + IV_LEN);
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result.extend_from_slice(&self.encrypt_key);
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result.extend_from_slice(&self.encrypt_iv.to_be_bytes());
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result
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}
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}
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/// Generate a valid random nonce for Telegram handshake
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pub fn generate_nonce<R: FnMut(usize) -> Vec<u8>>(mut random_bytes: R) -> [u8; HANDSHAKE_LEN] {
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loop {
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let nonce_vec = random_bytes(HANDSHAKE_LEN);
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let mut nonce = [0u8; HANDSHAKE_LEN];
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nonce.copy_from_slice(&nonce_vec);
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if is_valid_nonce(&nonce) {
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return nonce;
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}
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}
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}
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/// Check if nonce is valid (not matching reserved patterns)
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pub fn is_valid_nonce(nonce: &[u8; HANDSHAKE_LEN]) -> bool {
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// Check first byte
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if RESERVED_NONCE_FIRST_BYTES.contains(&nonce[0]) {
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return false;
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}
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// Check first 4 bytes
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let first_four: [u8; 4] = nonce[..4].try_into().unwrap();
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if RESERVED_NONCE_BEGINNINGS.contains(&first_four) {
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return false;
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}
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// Check bytes 4-7
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let continue_four: [u8; 4] = nonce[4..8].try_into().unwrap();
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if RESERVED_NONCE_CONTINUES.contains(&continue_four) {
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return false;
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}
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true
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}
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/// Prepare nonce for sending to Telegram
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pub fn prepare_tg_nonce(
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nonce: &mut [u8; HANDSHAKE_LEN],
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proto_tag: ProtoTag,
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enc_key_iv: Option<&[u8]>, // For fast mode
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) {
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// Set protocol tag
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nonce[PROTO_TAG_POS..PROTO_TAG_POS + 4].copy_from_slice(&proto_tag.to_bytes());
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// For fast mode, copy the reversed enc_key_iv
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if let Some(key_iv) = enc_key_iv {
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let reversed: Vec<u8> = key_iv.iter().rev().copied().collect();
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nonce[SKIP_LEN..SKIP_LEN + KEY_LEN + IV_LEN].copy_from_slice(&reversed);
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}
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}
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/// Encrypt the outgoing nonce for Telegram
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pub fn encrypt_nonce(nonce: &[u8; HANDSHAKE_LEN]) -> Vec<u8> {
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// Derive encryption key from the nonce itself
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let key_iv = &nonce[SKIP_LEN..SKIP_LEN + KEY_LEN + IV_LEN];
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let enc_key = sha256(key_iv);
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let enc_iv = u128::from_be_bytes(key_iv[..IV_LEN].try_into().unwrap());
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let mut encryptor = AesCtr::new(&enc_key, enc_iv);
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// Only encrypt from PROTO_TAG_POS onwards
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let mut result = nonce.to_vec();
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let encrypted_part = encryptor.encrypt(&nonce[PROTO_TAG_POS..]);
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result[PROTO_TAG_POS..].copy_from_slice(&encrypted_part);
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result
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use super::*;
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#[test]
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fn test_is_valid_nonce() {
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// Valid nonce
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let mut valid = [0x42u8; HANDSHAKE_LEN];
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valid[4..8].copy_from_slice(&[1, 2, 3, 4]);
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assert!(is_valid_nonce(&valid));
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// Invalid: starts with 0xef
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let mut invalid = [0x00u8; HANDSHAKE_LEN];
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invalid[0] = 0xef;
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assert!(!is_valid_nonce(&invalid));
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// Invalid: starts with HEAD
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let mut invalid = [0x00u8; HANDSHAKE_LEN];
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invalid[..4].copy_from_slice(b"HEAD");
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assert!(!is_valid_nonce(&invalid));
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// Invalid: bytes 4-7 are zeros
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let mut invalid = [0x42u8; HANDSHAKE_LEN];
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invalid[4..8].copy_from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0]);
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assert!(!is_valid_nonce(&invalid));
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_generate_nonce() {
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let mut counter = 0u8;
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let nonce = generate_nonce(|n| {
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counter = counter.wrapping_add(1);
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vec![counter; n]
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});
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assert!(is_valid_nonce(&nonce));
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assert_eq!(nonce.len(), HANDSHAKE_LEN);
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}
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}
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