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Zeroize for key + log refactor + fix tests

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- Fixed tests that failed to compile due to mismatched generic parameters of HandshakeResult:
  - Changed `HandshakeResult<i32>` to `HandshakeResult<i32, (), ()>`
  - Changed `HandshakeResult::BadClient` to `HandshakeResult::BadClient { reader: (), writer: () }`

- Added Zeroize for all structures holding key material:
  - AesCbc – key and IV are zeroized on drop
  - SecureRandomInner – PRNG output buffer is zeroized on drop; local key copy in constructor is zeroized immediately after being passed to the cipher
  - ObfuscationParams – all four key‑material fields are zeroized on drop
  - HandshakeSuccess – all four key‑material fields are zeroized on drop

- Added protocol‑requirement documentation for legacy hashes (CodeQL suppression) in hash.rs (MD5/SHA‑1)

- Added documentation for zeroize limitations of AesCtr (opaque cipher state) in aes.rs

- Implemented silent‑mode logging and refactored initialization:
  - Added LogLevel enum to config and CLI flags --silent / --log-level
  - Added parse_cli() to handle --silent, --log-level, --help
  - Restructured main.rs initialization order: CLI → config load → determine log level → init tracing
  - Errors before tracing initialization are printed via eprintln!
  - Proxy links (tg://) are printed via println! – always visible regardless of log level
  - Configuration summary and operational messages are logged via info! (suppressed in silent mode)
  - Connection processing errors are lowered to debug! (hidden in silent mode)
  - Warning about default tls_domain moved to main (after tracing init)

Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
Alexey
2026-02-07 19:49:41 +03:00
parent b9428d9780
commit 92cedabc81
12 changed files with 355 additions and 225 deletions
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64
src/proxy/handshake.rs
View File

@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
//! MTProto Handshake Magics
//! MTProto Handshake
use std::net::SocketAddr;
use tokio::io::{AsyncRead, AsyncWrite, AsyncWriteExt};
use tracing::{debug, warn, trace, info};
use zeroize::Zeroize;
use crate::crypto::{sha256, AesCtr, SecureRandom};
use crate::protocol::constants::*;
@@ -13,6 +14,9 @@ use crate::stats::ReplayChecker;
use crate::config::ProxyConfig;
/// Result of successful handshake
///
/// Key material (`dec_key`, `dec_iv`, `enc_key`, `enc_iv`) is
/// zeroized on drop.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct HandshakeSuccess {
/// Authenticated user name
@@ -33,6 +37,15 @@ pub struct HandshakeSuccess {
pub is_tls: bool,
}
impl Drop for HandshakeSuccess {
fn drop(&mut self) {
self.dec_key.zeroize();
self.dec_iv.zeroize();
self.enc_key.zeroize();
self.enc_iv.zeroize();
}
}
/// Handle fake TLS handshake
pub async fn handle_tls_handshake<R, W>(
handshake: &[u8],
@@ -49,30 +62,25 @@ where
{
debug!(peer = %peer, handshake_len = handshake.len(), "Processing TLS handshake");
// Check minimum length
if handshake.len() < tls::TLS_DIGEST_POS + tls::TLS_DIGEST_LEN + 1 {
debug!(peer = %peer, "TLS handshake too short");
return HandshakeResult::BadClient { reader, writer };
}
// Extract digest for replay check
let digest = &handshake[tls::TLS_DIGEST_POS..tls::TLS_DIGEST_POS + tls::TLS_DIGEST_LEN];
let digest_half = &digest[..tls::TLS_DIGEST_HALF_LEN];
// Check for replay
if replay_checker.check_tls_digest(digest_half) {
warn!(peer = %peer, "TLS replay attack detected (duplicate digest)");
return HandshakeResult::BadClient { reader, writer };
}
// Build secrets list
let secrets: Vec<(String, Vec<u8>)> = config.access.users.iter()
.filter_map(|(name, hex)| {
hex::decode(hex).ok().map(|bytes| (name.clone(), bytes))
})
.collect();
// Validate handshake
let validation = match tls::validate_tls_handshake(
handshake,
&secrets,
@@ -89,13 +97,11 @@ where
}
};
// Get secret for response
let secret = match secrets.iter().find(|(name, _)| *name == validation.user) {
Some((_, s)) => s,
None => return HandshakeResult::BadClient { reader, writer },
};
// Build and send response
let response = tls::build_server_hello(
secret,
&validation.digest,
@@ -116,7 +122,6 @@ where
return HandshakeResult::Error(ProxyError::Io(e));
}
// Record for replay protection only after successful handshake
replay_checker.add_tls_digest(digest_half);
info!(
@@ -148,26 +153,21 @@ where
{
trace!(peer = %peer, handshake = ?hex::encode(handshake), "MTProto handshake bytes");
// Extract prekey and IV
let dec_prekey_iv = &handshake[SKIP_LEN..SKIP_LEN + PREKEY_LEN + IV_LEN];
// Check for replay
if replay_checker.check_handshake(dec_prekey_iv) {
warn!(peer = %peer, "MTProto replay attack detected");
return HandshakeResult::BadClient { reader, writer };
}
// Reversed for encryption direction
let enc_prekey_iv: Vec<u8> = dec_prekey_iv.iter().rev().copied().collect();
// Try each user's secret
for (user, secret_hex) in &config.access.users {
let secret = match hex::decode(secret_hex) {
Ok(s) => s,
Err(_) => continue,
};
// Derive decryption key
let dec_prekey = &dec_prekey_iv[..PREKEY_LEN];
let dec_iv_bytes = &dec_prekey_iv[PREKEY_LEN..];
@@ -178,11 +178,9 @@ where
let dec_iv = u128::from_be_bytes(dec_iv_bytes.try_into().unwrap());
// Decrypt handshake to check protocol tag
let mut decryptor = AesCtr::new(&dec_key, dec_iv);
let decrypted = decryptor.decrypt(handshake);
// Check protocol tag
let tag_bytes: [u8; 4] = decrypted[PROTO_TAG_POS..PROTO_TAG_POS + 4]
.try_into()
.unwrap();
@@ -192,7 +190,6 @@ where
None => continue,
};
// Check if mode is enabled
let mode_ok = match proto_tag {
ProtoTag::Secure => {
if is_tls { config.general.modes.tls } else { config.general.modes.secure }
@@ -205,12 +202,10 @@ where
continue;
}
// Extract DC index
let dc_idx = i16::from_le_bytes(
decrypted[DC_IDX_POS..DC_IDX_POS + 2].try_into().unwrap()
);
// Derive encryption key
let enc_prekey = &enc_prekey_iv[..PREKEY_LEN];
let enc_iv_bytes = &enc_prekey_iv[PREKEY_LEN..];
@@ -221,10 +216,8 @@ where
let enc_iv = u128::from_be_bytes(enc_iv_bytes.try_into().unwrap());
// Record for replay protection
replay_checker.add_handshake(dec_prekey_iv);
// Create new cipher instances
let decryptor = AesCtr::new(&dec_key, dec_iv);
let encryptor = AesCtr::new(&enc_key, enc_iv);
@@ -326,13 +319,11 @@ mod tests {
let client_dec_iv = 12345u128;
let rng = SecureRandom::new();
let (nonce, tg_enc_key, tg_enc_iv, tg_dec_key, tg_dec_iv) =
let (nonce, _tg_enc_key, _tg_enc_iv, _tg_dec_key, _tg_dec_iv) =
generate_tg_nonce(ProtoTag::Secure, &client_dec_key, client_dec_iv, &rng, false);
// Check length
assert_eq!(nonce.len(), HANDSHAKE_LEN);
// Check proto tag is set
let tag_bytes: [u8; 4] = nonce[PROTO_TAG_POS..PROTO_TAG_POS + 4].try_into().unwrap();
assert_eq!(ProtoTag::from_bytes(tag_bytes), Some(ProtoTag::Secure));
}
@@ -349,11 +340,28 @@ mod tests {
let encrypted = encrypt_tg_nonce(&nonce);
assert_eq!(encrypted.len(), HANDSHAKE_LEN);
// First PROTO_TAG_POS bytes should be unchanged
assert_eq!(&encrypted[..PROTO_TAG_POS], &nonce[..PROTO_TAG_POS]);
// Rest should be different (encrypted)
assert_ne!(&encrypted[PROTO_TAG_POS..], &nonce[PROTO_TAG_POS..]);
}
#[test]
fn test_handshake_success_zeroize_on_drop() {
let success = HandshakeSuccess {
user: "test".to_string(),
dc_idx: 2,
proto_tag: ProtoTag::Secure,
dec_key: [0xAA; 32],
dec_iv: 0xBBBBBBBB,
enc_key: [0xCC; 32],
enc_iv: 0xDDDDDDDD,
peer: "127.0.0.1:1234".parse().unwrap(),
is_tls: true,
};
assert_eq!(success.dec_key, [0xAA; 32]);
assert_eq!(success.enc_key, [0xCC; 32]);
drop(success);
// Drop impl zeroizes key material without panic
}
}