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Middle-End Drafts

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Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
Alexey
2026-02-15 12:30:40 +03:00
parent 427c7dd375
commit f2455c9cb1
9 changed files with 174 additions and 82 deletions
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50
src/proxy/handshake.rs
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@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ where
let digest = &handshake[tls::TLS_DIGEST_POS..tls::TLS_DIGEST_POS + tls::TLS_DIGEST_LEN];
let digest_half = &digest[..tls::TLS_DIGEST_HALF_LEN];
if replay_checker.check_tls_digest(digest_half) {
if replay_checker.check_and_add_tls_digest(digest_half) {
warn!(peer = %peer, "TLS replay attack detected (duplicate digest)");
return HandshakeResult::BadClient { reader, writer };
}
@@ -122,8 +122,6 @@ where
return HandshakeResult::Error(ProxyError::Io(e));
}
replay_checker.add_tls_digest(digest_half);
info!(
peer = %peer,
user = %validation.user,
@@ -155,7 +153,7 @@ where
let dec_prekey_iv = &handshake[SKIP_LEN..SKIP_LEN + PREKEY_LEN + IV_LEN];
if replay_checker.check_handshake(dec_prekey_iv) {
if replay_checker.check_and_add_handshake(dec_prekey_iv) {
warn!(peer = %peer, "MTProto replay attack detected");
return HandshakeResult::BadClient { reader, writer };
}
@@ -216,8 +214,6 @@ where
let enc_iv = u128::from_be_bytes(enc_iv_bytes.try_into().unwrap());
replay_checker.add_handshake(dec_prekey_iv);
let encryptor = AesCtr::new(&enc_key, enc_iv);
let success = HandshakeSuccess {
@@ -256,8 +252,10 @@ where
pub fn generate_tg_nonce(
proto_tag: ProtoTag,
dc_idx: i16,
client_dec_key: &[u8; 32],
client_dec_iv: u128,
_client_dec_key: &[u8; 32],
_client_dec_iv: u128,
client_enc_key: &[u8; 32],
client_enc_iv: u128,
rng: &SecureRandom,
fast_mode: bool,
) -> ([u8; HANDSHAKE_LEN], [u8; 32], u128, [u8; 32], u128) {
@@ -278,9 +276,11 @@ pub fn generate_tg_nonce(
nonce[DC_IDX_POS..DC_IDX_POS + 2].copy_from_slice(&dc_idx.to_le_bytes());
if fast_mode {
nonce[SKIP_LEN..SKIP_LEN + KEY_LEN].copy_from_slice(client_dec_key);
nonce[SKIP_LEN + KEY_LEN..SKIP_LEN + KEY_LEN + IV_LEN]
.copy_from_slice(&client_dec_iv.to_be_bytes());
let mut key_iv = Vec::with_capacity(KEY_LEN + IV_LEN);
key_iv.extend_from_slice(client_enc_key);
key_iv.extend_from_slice(&client_enc_iv.to_be_bytes());
key_iv.reverse(); // Python/C behavior: reversed enc_key+enc_iv in nonce
nonce[SKIP_LEN..SKIP_LEN + KEY_LEN + IV_LEN].copy_from_slice(&key_iv);
}
let enc_key_iv = &nonce[SKIP_LEN..SKIP_LEN + KEY_LEN + IV_LEN];
@@ -332,10 +332,21 @@ mod tests {
fn test_generate_tg_nonce() {
let client_dec_key = [0x42u8; 32];
let client_dec_iv = 12345u128;
let client_enc_key = [0x24u8; 32];
let client_enc_iv = 54321u128;
let rng = SecureRandom::new();
let (nonce, _tg_enc_key, _tg_enc_iv, _tg_dec_key, _tg_dec_iv) =
generate_tg_nonce(ProtoTag::Secure, 2, &client_dec_key, client_dec_iv, &rng, false);
generate_tg_nonce(
ProtoTag::Secure,
2,
&client_dec_key,
client_dec_iv,
&client_enc_key,
client_enc_iv,
&rng,
false,
);
assert_eq!(nonce.len(), HANDSHAKE_LEN);
@@ -347,10 +358,21 @@ mod tests {
fn test_encrypt_tg_nonce() {
let client_dec_key = [0x42u8; 32];
let client_dec_iv = 12345u128;
let client_enc_key = [0x24u8; 32];
let client_enc_iv = 54321u128;
let rng = SecureRandom::new();
let (nonce, _, _, _, _) =
generate_tg_nonce(ProtoTag::Secure, 2, &client_dec_key, client_dec_iv, &rng, false);
generate_tg_nonce(
ProtoTag::Secure,
2,
&client_dec_key,
client_dec_iv,
&client_enc_key,
client_enc_iv,
&rng,
false,
);
let encrypted = encrypt_tg_nonce(&nonce);
@@ -379,4 +401,4 @@ mod tests {
drop(success);
// Drop impl zeroizes key material without panic
}
}
}