Files
telemt/src/protocol/obfuscation.rs
Alexey 92cedabc81 Zeroize for key + log refactor + fix tests
- Fixed tests that failed to compile due to mismatched generic parameters of HandshakeResult:
  - Changed `HandshakeResult<i32>` to `HandshakeResult<i32, (), ()>`
  - Changed `HandshakeResult::BadClient` to `HandshakeResult::BadClient { reader: (), writer: () }`

- Added Zeroize for all structures holding key material:
  - AesCbc – key and IV are zeroized on drop
  - SecureRandomInner – PRNG output buffer is zeroized on drop; local key copy in constructor is zeroized immediately after being passed to the cipher
  - ObfuscationParams – all four key‑material fields are zeroized on drop
  - HandshakeSuccess – all four key‑material fields are zeroized on drop

- Added protocol‑requirement documentation for legacy hashes (CodeQL suppression) in hash.rs (MD5/SHA‑1)

- Added documentation for zeroize limitations of AesCtr (opaque cipher state) in aes.rs

- Implemented silent‑mode logging and refactored initialization:
  - Added LogLevel enum to config and CLI flags --silent / --log-level
  - Added parse_cli() to handle --silent, --log-level, --help
  - Restructured main.rs initialization order: CLI → config load → determine log level → init tracing
  - Errors before tracing initialization are printed via eprintln!
  - Proxy links (tg://) are printed via println! – always visible regardless of log level
  - Configuration summary and operational messages are logged via info! (suppressed in silent mode)
  - Connection processing errors are lowered to debug! (hidden in silent mode)
  - Warning about default tls_domain moved to main (after tracing init)

Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-02-07 19:49:41 +03:00

211 lines
6.7 KiB
Rust

//! MTProto Obfuscation
use zeroize::Zeroize;
use crate::crypto::{sha256, AesCtr};
use crate::error::Result;
use super::constants::*;
/// Obfuscation parameters from handshake
///
/// Key material is zeroized on drop.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct ObfuscationParams {
/// Key for decrypting client -> proxy traffic
pub decrypt_key: [u8; 32],
/// IV for decrypting client -> proxy traffic
pub decrypt_iv: u128,
/// Key for encrypting proxy -> client traffic
pub encrypt_key: [u8; 32],
/// IV for encrypting proxy -> client traffic
pub encrypt_iv: u128,
/// Protocol tag (abridged/intermediate/secure)
pub proto_tag: ProtoTag,
/// Datacenter index
pub dc_idx: i16,
}
impl Drop for ObfuscationParams {
fn drop(&mut self) {
self.decrypt_key.zeroize();
self.decrypt_iv.zeroize();
self.encrypt_key.zeroize();
self.encrypt_iv.zeroize();
}
}
impl ObfuscationParams {
/// Parse obfuscation parameters from handshake bytes
/// Returns None if handshake doesn't match any user secret
pub fn from_handshake(
handshake: &[u8; HANDSHAKE_LEN],
secrets: &[(String, Vec<u8>)],
) -> Option<(Self, String)> {
let dec_prekey_iv = &handshake[SKIP_LEN..SKIP_LEN + PREKEY_LEN + IV_LEN];
let dec_prekey = &dec_prekey_iv[..PREKEY_LEN];
let dec_iv_bytes = &dec_prekey_iv[PREKEY_LEN..];
let enc_prekey_iv: Vec<u8> = dec_prekey_iv.iter().rev().copied().collect();
let enc_prekey = &enc_prekey_iv[..PREKEY_LEN];
let enc_iv_bytes = &enc_prekey_iv[PREKEY_LEN..];
for (username, secret) in secrets {
let mut dec_key_input = Vec::with_capacity(PREKEY_LEN + secret.len());
dec_key_input.extend_from_slice(dec_prekey);
dec_key_input.extend_from_slice(secret);
let decrypt_key = sha256(&dec_key_input);
let decrypt_iv = u128::from_be_bytes(dec_iv_bytes.try_into().unwrap());
let mut decryptor = AesCtr::new(&decrypt_key, decrypt_iv);
let decrypted = decryptor.decrypt(handshake);
let tag_bytes: [u8; 4] = decrypted[PROTO_TAG_POS..PROTO_TAG_POS + 4]
.try_into()
.unwrap();
let proto_tag = match ProtoTag::from_bytes(tag_bytes) {
Some(tag) => tag,
None => continue,
};
let dc_idx = i16::from_le_bytes(
decrypted[DC_IDX_POS..DC_IDX_POS + 2].try_into().unwrap()
);
let mut enc_key_input = Vec::with_capacity(PREKEY_LEN + secret.len());
enc_key_input.extend_from_slice(enc_prekey);
enc_key_input.extend_from_slice(secret);
let encrypt_key = sha256(&enc_key_input);
let encrypt_iv = u128::from_be_bytes(enc_iv_bytes.try_into().unwrap());
return Some((
ObfuscationParams {
decrypt_key,
decrypt_iv,
encrypt_key,
encrypt_iv,
proto_tag,
dc_idx,
},
username.clone(),
));
}
None
}
/// Create AES-CTR decryptor for client -> proxy direction
pub fn create_decryptor(&self) -> AesCtr {
AesCtr::new(&self.decrypt_key, self.decrypt_iv)
}
/// Create AES-CTR encryptor for proxy -> client direction
pub fn create_encryptor(&self) -> AesCtr {
AesCtr::new(&self.encrypt_key, self.encrypt_iv)
}
/// Get the combined encrypt key and IV for fast mode
pub fn enc_key_iv(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(KEY_LEN + IV_LEN);
result.extend_from_slice(&self.encrypt_key);
result.extend_from_slice(&self.encrypt_iv.to_be_bytes());
result
}
}
/// Generate a valid random nonce for Telegram handshake
pub fn generate_nonce<R: FnMut(usize) -> Vec<u8>>(mut random_bytes: R) -> [u8; HANDSHAKE_LEN] {
loop {
let nonce_vec = random_bytes(HANDSHAKE_LEN);
let mut nonce = [0u8; HANDSHAKE_LEN];
nonce.copy_from_slice(&nonce_vec);
if is_valid_nonce(&nonce) {
return nonce;
}
}
}
/// Check if nonce is valid (not matching reserved patterns)
pub fn is_valid_nonce(nonce: &[u8; HANDSHAKE_LEN]) -> bool {
if RESERVED_NONCE_FIRST_BYTES.contains(&nonce[0]) {
return false;
}
let first_four: [u8; 4] = nonce[..4].try_into().unwrap();
if RESERVED_NONCE_BEGINNINGS.contains(&first_four) {
return false;
}
let continue_four: [u8; 4] = nonce[4..8].try_into().unwrap();
if RESERVED_NONCE_CONTINUES.contains(&continue_four) {
return false;
}
true
}
/// Prepare nonce for sending to Telegram
pub fn prepare_tg_nonce(
nonce: &mut [u8; HANDSHAKE_LEN],
proto_tag: ProtoTag,
enc_key_iv: Option<&[u8]>,
) {
nonce[PROTO_TAG_POS..PROTO_TAG_POS + 4].copy_from_slice(&proto_tag.to_bytes());
if let Some(key_iv) = enc_key_iv {
let reversed: Vec<u8> = key_iv.iter().rev().copied().collect();
nonce[SKIP_LEN..SKIP_LEN + KEY_LEN + IV_LEN].copy_from_slice(&reversed);
}
}
/// Encrypt the outgoing nonce for Telegram
pub fn encrypt_nonce(nonce: &[u8; HANDSHAKE_LEN]) -> Vec<u8> {
let key_iv = &nonce[SKIP_LEN..SKIP_LEN + KEY_LEN + IV_LEN];
let enc_key = sha256(key_iv);
let enc_iv = u128::from_be_bytes(key_iv[..IV_LEN].try_into().unwrap());
let mut encryptor = AesCtr::new(&enc_key, enc_iv);
let mut result = nonce.to_vec();
let encrypted_part = encryptor.encrypt(&nonce[PROTO_TAG_POS..]);
result[PROTO_TAG_POS..].copy_from_slice(&encrypted_part);
result
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn test_is_valid_nonce() {
let mut valid = [0x42u8; HANDSHAKE_LEN];
valid[4..8].copy_from_slice(&[1, 2, 3, 4]);
assert!(is_valid_nonce(&valid));
let mut invalid = [0x00u8; HANDSHAKE_LEN];
invalid[0] = 0xef;
assert!(!is_valid_nonce(&invalid));
let mut invalid = [0x00u8; HANDSHAKE_LEN];
invalid[..4].copy_from_slice(b"HEAD");
assert!(!is_valid_nonce(&invalid));
let mut invalid = [0x42u8; HANDSHAKE_LEN];
invalid[4..8].copy_from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0]);
assert!(!is_valid_nonce(&invalid));
}
#[test]
fn test_generate_nonce() {
let mut counter = 0u8;
let nonce = generate_nonce(|n| {
counter = counter.wrapping_add(1);
vec![counter; n]
});
assert!(is_valid_nonce(&nonce));
assert_eq!(nonce.len(), HANDSHAKE_LEN);
}
}